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Importers, Exporters, and Exchange Rate Disconnect†
By Mary Amiti, Oleg Itskhoki, and Jozef Konings*
Large exporters are simultaneously large importers. We show 
that this pattern is key to understanding low aggregate exchange 
rate  pass-through as well as the variation in pass-through across 
exporters. We develop a theoretical framework with variable 
markups and imported inputs, which predicts that firms with high 
import shares and high market shares have low exchange rate 
pass-through. We test and quantify the theoretical mechanism using 
Belgian firm-product-level data on imports and exports. Small 
nonimporting firms have nearly complete pass-through, while large 
import-intensive exporters have pass-through around 50  percent, 
with the marginal cost and markup channels contributing roughly 
equally. (JEL D24, F14, F31, L60)
One of the central puzzles in international macroeconomics is why large move-
ments in exchange rates have small effects on the prices of internationally traded 
goods. This exchange rate disconnect has generated a vast literature, yet no empiri-
cal pass-through study has taken into account one of the most salient features of 
international trade, that is, that the largest exporters are simultaneously the largest 
importers. In this paper, we show that this pattern is key to understanding the low 
aggregate pass-through, as well as the variation in pass-through across firms.
Using detailed Belgian micro data, we find that more import-intensive export-
ers have significantly lower exchange rate pass-through into their export prices, 
as they face offsetting exchange rate effects on their marginal costs. These data 
reveal that the distribution of import intensity among exporters is highly skewed, 
with the import-intensive firms being among the largest exporters, accounting for 
a major share of international trade. Consequently, the import-intensive firms also 
have high export market shares and hence set high markups and actively move them 
in response to changes in marginal cost, providing a second channel that limits the 
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effect of exchange rate shocks on export prices. These two mechanisms reinforce 
each other and act to introduce a buffer between local costs and international prices 
of the major exporters, thus playing a central role in limiting the transmission of 
exchange rate shocks across countries. The availability of firm-level data with 
imports by source country and exports by destination, combined with domestic cost 
data, enables us to estimate the magnitude of these two channels.
To guide our empirical strategy, we develop a theoretical framework to study 
the forces that jointly determine a firm’s decisions to source its intermediate inputs 
internationally and to set markups in each of its export destinations. The two build-
ing blocks of our theoretical framework are an oligopolistic competition model of 
variable markups following Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and a model of the firm’s 
choice to import intermediate inputs at a fixed cost following Halpern, Koren, and 
Szeidl (2011). These two ingredients allow us to capture the key patterns in the data 
that we focus on, and their interaction generates new insights on the determinants of 
exchange rate pass-through. In equilibrium, the more productive firms end up having 
greater market shares and choose to source a larger share of their inputs internation-
ally, which in turn further amplifies the productivity advantage of these firms. The 
theory further predicts that a firm’s import intensity and export market share form 
a sufficient statistic for its exchange rate pass-through within industry-destination, 
with import intensity proxying for marginal cost sensitivity to the exchange rate and 
market shares proxying for markup elasticity.1
We test the predictions of the theory with a rich dataset of Belgian exporters 
for the period 2000–2008. A distinctive feature of these data is that they comprise 
 firm-level imports by source country and exports by destination at the CN 8-digit 
product codes (close to 10,000 distinct product codes), which we match with 
 firm-level characteristics, such as wages and expenditure on inputs. This allows us 
to construct an import intensity measure for each firm as the share of imports in total 
variable costs and a measure of the firm’s market share for each export destination, 
which are the two key firm characteristics in our analysis. Further, with the informa-
tion on imports by source country, we can separate inputs from euro and non-euro 
countries, which is an important distinction since imported inputs from within the 
euro area are in the Belgian firms’ currency.
We start our empirical analysis by documenting some new stylized facts related 
to the distribution of import intensity across firms, lending support to the assump-
tions and predictions of our theoretical framework. We show that in the already very 
select group of exporters relative to the overall population of manufacturing firms, 
there still exists a substantial heterogeneity in the share of imported inputs sourced 
internationally, in particular from the more distant source countries outside the euro 
1 Note that the relationship between import intensity and marginal cost is very general and does not rely on a par-
ticular structural model. In turn, the relationship between market share and markup is not universal, yet it emerges 
in a class of models commonly used in international macro (see Burstein and Gopinath 2013). The structural micro 
literature, however, adopts more sophisticated demand systems where markup variability depends not only on mar-
ket share, but also on prices, product characteristics, and the distribution of consumer characteristics. Our approach 
provides a simple approximation of the markup, linking it exclusively to the market share of the firm, and while 
being less general at the level of individual industries, this approach allows us to proceed with estimation across 
broad sectors and multiple export markets. We find that the variation in the market share alone explains substantial 
variation in the markup variability across firms.
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zone. The import intensity is strongly correlated with firm size and other firm char-
acteristics and is heavily skewed toward the largest exporters.
Our main empirical specification, as suggested by the theory, relates exchange 
rate pass-through with the firm’s import intensity capturing the marginal cost chan-
nel and the destination-specific market shares capturing the markup channel. We 
estimate the cross-sectional relationship between pass-through and its determinants 
within industries and destinations, holding constant the general equilibrium forces 
common to all firms.2 Our methodological contribution is to show that such a rela-
tionship holds independently of the general equilibrium environment, thus we do 
not need to make specific assumptions about the sources of variation in the exchange 
rate. The exchange rate pass-through coefficients in this relationship can be directly 
estimated without imposing strong partial equilibrium or exogeneity assumptions. 
Theory further provides closed-form expressions for these coefficients, which allows 
us to directly test for the structural mechanism emphasized in the model.3
The results provide strong support for the theory. First, we show that import inten-
sity is an important correlate of a firm’s exchange rate pass-through, with each addi-
tional 10 percentage points of imports in total variable costs reducing pass-through 
by over 6 percentage points. Second, we show that this effect is due to both the mar-
ginal cost channel, which import intensity affects directly, and the markup channel 
through the selection effect. Finally, when we include market share, which proxies 
for the markup channel, together with import intensity, we find these two variables 
jointly to be robust predictors of exchange rate pass-through across different sub-
samples and specifications, even after controlling for other firm characteristics such 
as productivity and employment size.
Quantitatively, these results are large. A firm at the fifth percentile of both import 
intensity and market share (both approximately equal to zero) has a nearly com-
plete pass-through (94 percent and statistically indistinguishable from 100 percent). 
In contrast, a firm at the ninety-fifth percentile of both import intensity and market 
share distributions has a pass-through slightly above 50 percent, with import intensity 
and market share contributing nearly equally to this variation across firms. In other 
words, while small exporters barely adjust their producer prices and fully pass on the 
exchange rate movements to foreign consumers, the largest exporters offset almost 
half of the exchange rate movement by adjusting their prices already at the factory 
gates. Active markup adjustment by the large firms explains this only in part, and an 
equally important role is played by the marginal cost channel by means of imported 
inputs. These results have important implications for aggregate pass-through since 
the low pass-through firms account for a disproportionately large share of exports.
Related Literature.—Our paper is related to three strands of literature. First, 
it relates to the recent and growing literature on the interaction of importing and 
exporting decisions of firms. Earlier work, for example, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 
2 Such common forces include the correlations of sector-destination-specific price index, sector-specific produc-
tivity, and cost index with the exchange rate.
3 In particular, we show in the data that import-intensive exporters have lower pass-through due to greater sensi-
tivity of their marginal costs to exchange rates. Furthermore, the effect of import intensity on pass-through is larger 
when the import and export exchange rates are closely correlated and when the pass-through into the import prices 
is high, confirming the theoretical predictions.
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(2009), has documented a large overlap in the import and export activity of firms.4 
Indeed, major exporters are almost always major importers, and this is also true in 
our dataset. We focus exclusively on the already select group of exporters, most of 
whom are also importers from multiple source countries. We emphasize the strong 
selection that still operates within the group of exporters, in particular the hetero-
geneity in the intensity with which firms import their intermediate inputs and its 
consequences for export price pass-through.
Second, our paper is related to the recent empirical and structural work on the 
relationship between firm import intensity and firm productivity. Although we base 
our model on Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011), who estimate the effects of imports 
on total factor productivity for Hungarian firms, similar models were developed in 
Amiti and Davis (2012) to study the effects of import tariffs on firm wages and in 
Gopinath and Neiman (2014) to study the effects of the Argentine trade collapse fol-
lowing the currency devaluation of 2001 on the economy-wide productivity.5 In our 
study, we focus instead on how the interplay between import intensity and markup 
variability contributes to incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
Third, our paper contributes to the vast literature on the exchange rate disconnect 
(see Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001; Engel 2001) and in particular on the incomplete 
pass-through of exchange rate shocks into international prices. In the past decade, 
substantial progress has been made in the study of this phenomenon, both theoreti-
cally and empirically.6 This literature has explored three channels leading to incom-
plete pass-through. The first channel, as surveyed in Engel (2003), is short-run 
nominal rigidities with prices sticky in the local currency of the destination market, 
labeled in the literature as local currency pricing (LCP). Under LCP, the firms that 
do not adjust prices have zero short-run pass-through. Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) 
provide direct evidence on the extent of LCP in US import and export prices. The 
second channel—pricing-to-market (PTM)—arises in models of variable markups 
in which firms optimally choose different prices for different destinations depending 
on local market conditions. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) provide an example of a 
recent quantitative investigation of the PTM channel and its implication for inter-
national aggregate prices.7 Finally, the third channel of incomplete pass-through 
into consumer prices often considered in the literature is local distribution costs, 
as for example in Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) and Goldberg and Campa 
(2010). Our imported inputs channel is similar in spirit to the local distribution 
costs in that they make the costs of the firm more stable in the local currency of 
4 Other related papers include Kugler and Verhoogen (2009); Manova and Zhang (2009); Feng, Li, and Swenson 
(2012); and Damijan, Konings, and Polanec (2012).
5 Blaum, Lelarge, and Peters (2013) document stylized facts about import behavior of French firms and provide 
another related model. Amiti and Konings (2007) provide an empirical analysis of the micro-level effects of imports 
on firm productivity.
6 For a survey of earlier work, see Goldberg and Knetter (1997), who in particular emphasize that “[l]ess is 
known about the relationship between costs and exchange rates” (see p. 1244). The handbook chapter by Burstein 
and Gopinath (2013) provides a summary of recent developments in this area.
7 Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) show the importance of PTM in matching patterns in the international aggregate 
and micro price data. Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) provide the most direct evidence on PTM by comparing the 
exchange rate response of prices of the same item sold to both the domestic and the international market. Gopinath, 
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) and Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) show that the PTM and LCP channels of incom-
plete pass-through interact and reinforce each other, with highly variable-markup firms endogenously choosing to 
price in local currency as well as adopting longer price durations.
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export  destination. The difference with the distribution cost channel is that the use 
of imported inputs results in incomplete pass-through not only into consumer prices, 
but also into producer factory gate prices.
A related line of literature, surveyed in Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008), has 
identified the PTM channel by structurally estimating industry demand to back 
out model-implied markups of the firms. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) apply this 
methodology in the context of the European car market, while Nakamura and Zerom 
(2010) and Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) study the coffee and the beer markets, 
respectively, incorporating sticky prices into the analysis. Based on the finding that 
markups do not vary enough to capture the variation in exporter prices arising from 
exchange rate volatility, these studies conclude there must be a residual role for the 
marginal cost channel, due to either the local distribution margin or imported inputs. 
Our paper is the first to directly estimate the importance of the marginal cost channel 
for incomplete pass-through into exporter prices arising from the use of imported 
intermediate inputs.
Our work is closely related to Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) in that we also 
study the variation in pass-through across heterogeneous firms. While they focus on 
the role of firm productivity and size, we emphasize the role of imported inputs and 
destination-specific market shares.8 Our approach also enables us to provide a quan-
titative decomposition of the contribution of the marginal cost and variable markup 
channels to incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I lays out the theoretical 
framework and provides the theoretical results that motivate the empirical analysis 
that follows. Section  II introduces the dataset and describes the stylized patterns 
of cross-sectional variation in the data. Section  III describes our main empirical 
findings. Section IV concludes. The technical derivations and additional results are 
provided in the online Appendix.
I. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework linking a firm’s exchange 
rate pass-through to its import intensity and export market shares, all of which are 
endogenously determined. We use this framework to formulate testable implications 
and to derive an equilibrium relationship, which we later estimate in the data. We 
start by laying out the two main ingredients of our framework—the Atkeson and 
Burstein (2008) model of strategic complementarities and variable markups and the 
Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011) model of the firm’s choice to import intermedi-
ate inputs. We then show how the interaction of these two mechanisms generates 
new theoretical insights on the determinants of exchange rate pass-through. The key 
predictions of this theory are that a firm’s import intensity and market shares are 
positively correlated in the cross section and together constitute a sufficient statistic 
for the exchange rate pass-through of the firm within sector-export market, with 
import intensity capturing the marginal cost sensitivity to the exchange rate and 
market share capturing the markup elasticity.
8 A number of earlier papers have linked pass-through with the market share of exporters (see Feenstra, Gagnon, 
and Knetter 1996; Alessandria 2004; Garetto 2012; Auer and Schoenle 2013).
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We characterize the equilibrium relationship among market share, import inten-
sity, and pass-through, which holds parametrically independently of the particular 
general equilibrium environment. The parameter values in this relationship depend 
on the specifics of the general equilibrium, in particular the equilibrium comove-
ment between aggregate variables such as exchange rates, price levels, and cost 
indexes. Nonetheless, we need not take a stand on the specific general equilibrium 
assumptions as we directly estimate these parameters using cross-sectional variation 
between firms within industries and export destinations, without relying on strong 
partial equilibrium or exchange rate exogeneity assumptions.
To focus our analysis on the relationship between import intensity and pass-through, 
we make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we condition our analysis on 
the subset of exporting firms, and hence we do not model entry, exit, or selection 
into exporting (as, for example, in Melitz 2003), but rather focus on the import deci-
sions of the firms. Similarly, we do not model the decision to export to multiple des-
tinations, but simply take this information as exogenously given. Furthermore, we 
assume all firms are single-product. In the empirical section we discuss the implica-
tions of relaxing these assumptions.
Second, we assume flexible price setting as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and 
hence do not need to characterize the currency choice (i.e., local versus producer 
currency pricing). This modeling choice is motivated by the nature of our dataset in 
which we use unit values as proxies for prices. Empirically, incomplete pass-through 
is at least in part due to price stickiness in local currency, and in light of this we pro-
vide a careful interpretation of our results in Section IIIE.9
Last, while the marginal cost channel emphasized in the paper is inherently a 
mechanism of real hedging, in modeling firms’ import decisions we abstract 
from choosing or switching import source countries to better hedge their export 
exchange rate risk. Empirically, we find that the positive correlation between a 
firm’s destination-specific exchange rate and its import-weighted exchange rate 
does not vary with the main firm variables that are the focus of our analysis (see 
Section IIID).10
A. Demand and Markups
Consider a firm producing a differentiated good i in sector s and supplying it 
to destination market k in period t. Consumers in each market have a nested CES 
demand over the varieties of goods, as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008). The  elasticity 
9 It is useful to keep in mind that, as shown in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010), the flexible-price 
pass-through forces shape the currency choice of the firms, i.e., firms with a low pass-through conditional on a price 
change choose to price in local currency, which further reduces the short-run pass-through of these firms. In this 
paper, we focus on the endogenous determinants of flexible-price (or long-run) pass-through in the cross section of 
firms, which in the sticky price environment would also contribute to the prevalence of local currency pricing, with 
the two forces working in the same direction.
10 Note that, under the assumption of risk neutrality of the firm and in the absence of liquidity constraints (for 
example, of the type modeled in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993), financial hedging constitutes only a side bet to 
the firm and does not affect its import and pricing decisions. Fauceglia, Shingal, and Wermelinger (2012) provide 
evidence on the role of imported inputs in “natural” hedging of export exchange rate risk by Swiss firms and Martin 
and Méjean (2012) provide survey evidence on the role of currency hedging in international transactions of firms 
in the euro zone.
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of substitution across the varieties within sectors is ρ, while the elasticity of substi-
tution across sectoral aggregates is η, and we assume ρ > η ≥ 1.
Under these circumstances, a firm i faces the following demand for its product:
(1)   Q k, i =  ξ k, i  P k, i −ρ  P k ρ−η  D k ,
where  Q k, i is quantity demanded,  ξ k, i is a relative preference (quality) parameter of 
the firm,  P k, i is the firm’s price,  P k is the sectoral price index, and  D k is the sectoral 
demand shifter, which the firm takes as given. Index k emphasizes that all these 
variables are destination specific. For brevity, we drop the additional subscripts s 
and t for sector and time, since all of our analysis focuses on variation within a given 
sector.
The sectoral price index is given by  P k ≡  [ ∑ i   ξ k, i  P k, i 1−ρ ] 1/(1−ρ) , where the summa-
tion is across all firms in sector s serving market k in time period t, and we normalize 
 ∑ i   ξ k, i = 1. As a convention, we quote all prices in the local currency of the destina-
tion market.
An important characteristic of the firm’s competitive position in a market is its 
market share given by
(2)   S k, i ≡   P k, i  Q k, i  _   ∑  i ′    P k,  i ′   Q k,  i ′  
 =  ξ  k, i  (  P k, i  _ P k   ) 1−ρ ∈ [0, 1],
where market share is sector-destination-year specific. The effective demand elastic-
ity for the firm is then
(3)   σ k, i ≡ −  d log  Q k, i  _d log  P k, i  = ρ(1 −  S k, i ) + η  S k, i ,
since ∂ log  P k /∂ log  P k, i =  S k, i . In words, the firm faces a demand elasticity that 
is a weighted average of the within-sector and the across-sector elasticities of 
substitution with the weight on the latter equal to the market share of the firm. 
High-market-share firms exert a stronger impact on the sectoral price index, making 
their demand less sensitive to their own price.
When firms compete in prices, they set a multiplicative markup   k, i ≡  σ k, i /( σ k, i − 1) over their costs. Firms face a demand with elasticity decreasing in 
the market share, and hence high-market-share firms charge high markups. We now 
define a measure of the markup elasticity with respect to the price of the firm, hold-
ing constant the sector price index:11
(4)   Γ k, i ≡ −  ∂ log   k, i  _∂ log  P k, i   =  
 S k, i 
  ___    ( ρ _ ρ − η −  S k, i )  ( 1 −  ρ − η _ρ − 1   S k, i )  > 0.
11 We focus on this partial measure of markup elasticity because this is the relevant measure in our empirical 
analysis, where the identification strategy exploits variation within industries across firms that all face the same 
price index. It should be noted that an alternative measure of markup elasticity, which does not hold the sector price 
index fixed, in general results in a U-shaped relationship between pass-through and market share (as, for example, 
in Garetto 2012 and Auer and Schoenle 2013).
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A lower price set by the firm leads to an increase in the firm’s market share, making 
optimal a larger markup. Furthermore, the markup elasticity is also increasing in the 
market share of the firm: firms with larger markups choose to adjust them by more 
in response to shocks and to keep their prices and quantities more stable. We sum-
marize this discussion in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: The market share of a firm,  S k, i , is a sufficient statistic for its 
markup; both markup   k, i and markup elasticity  Γ k, i are increasing in the market 
share of the firm.
This theoretical framework has two sharp predictions about the markup. First, 
the variation in the market share fully characterizes the variation in the markup 
elasticity across firms. As we discuss in the introduction, this is less than general, 
and alternative demand structures emphasize other determinants of markup vari-
ability. Nonetheless, our empirical analysis shows that this prediction provides a 
useful approximation across broad sectors and multiple export destinations. Second, 
markup variability is monotonically increasing in the market share. Although this 
prediction is also model specific, our empirical analysis provides support for this 
monotonic relationship (see Section IIIC).
B. Production and Imported Inputs
We build on Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2011) to model the cost structure of 
the firm and its choice to import intermediate inputs. Consider a firm i, which 
uses labor  L i and intermediate inputs  X i to produce its output  Y i according to the 
production function:
(5)   Y i =  Ω i  X i ϕ  L i 1−ϕ ,
where  Ω i is firm productivity. Parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1] measures the share of intermedi-
ate inputs in firm expenditure and is sector specific but common to all firms in the 
sector.
Intermediate inputs consist of a bundle of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] 
and aggregated according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:
(6)   X i = exp { ∫ 0 1 γ j log  X i, j d j } .
The types of intermediate inputs vary in their importance in the production process 
as measured by  γ j , which satisfy  ∫ 0 1  γ j d j = 1. Each type j of intermediate good 
comes in two varieties—domestic and foreign—which are imperfect substitutes:
(7)   X i, j =  [ Z i, j   ζ _ 1+ζ  +  a j  1 _ 1+ζ   M i, j  ζ _ 1+ζ  ]  1+ζ _ζ   ,
where  Z i, j and  M i, j are, respectively, the quantities of domestic and imported vari e ties 
of the intermediate good j used in production. The elasticity of substitution between 
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the domestic and the foreign varieties is (1 + ζ) > 1, and  a j measures the produc-
tivity advantage (when  a j > 1, and disadvantage otherwise) of the foreign variety. 
Note that since home and foreign varieties are imperfect substitutes, production is 
possible without the use of imported inputs. At the same time, imported inputs are 
useful due both to their potential productivity advantage  a j and to the love-of-variety 
feature of the production technology (7).
A firm needs to pay a firm-specific sunk cost  f i in terms of labor in order to import 
each type of the intermediate good. The cost of labor is given by the wage rate  W   ∗ , 
and the prices of domestic intermediates are { V j ∗ }, both denominated in units of 
producer currency (hence starred). The prices of foreign intermediates are {  m  U j }, 
where  U j is the price in foreign currency and   m is the nominal exchange rate mea-
sured as a unit of producer currency for one unit of foreign currency.12 The total 
cost is therefore given by  W  ∗ L i +  ∫ 0 1  V j  ∗ Z i, j d j +  ∫  J 0, i    (  m U j  M i, j +  W  ∗ f i ) d j, where 
J 0, i denotes the set of intermediates imported by the firm.
With this production structure, we can derive the cost function. In particular, 
given output  Y i and the set of imported intermediates  J 0, i , the firm chooses inputs to 
minimize its total costs subject to the production technology in equations (5)–(7). 
This results in the following total variable cost function net of the fixed costs 
of importing:
(8)  TV C i ∗ ( Y i |  J 0, i ) =   C 
 ∗  _  B i ϕ Ω i 
  Y i ,
where  C  ∗ is the cost index for a nonimporting firm.13 The use of imported inputs 
leads to a cost-reduction factor  B i ≡ B( J 0, i ) = exp { ∫  J 0, i     γ j log  b j d j } , where 
 b j ≡  [ 1 +  a j (  m U j / V j ∗ ) −ζ  ] 1/ζ is the productivity-enhancing effect from importing 
type-j intermediate good, adjusted for the relative cost of the import variety.
We now describe the optimal choice of the set of imported intermediate goods, 
J 0, i . For simplicity, we discuss here the case without uncertainty, and the online 
Appendix generalizes the results. First, we sort all intermediate goods j by  γ j log  b j , 
from highest to lowest. Then, the optimal set of imported intermediate inputs is an 
interval  J 0, i = [0,  j 0, i ], with  j 0, i ∈ [0, 1] denoting the cutoff intermediate good. The 
optimal choice of  j 0, i trades off the fixed cost of importing  W  ∗ f i for the reduction in 
total variable costs from the access to an additional imported input, which is propor-
tional to the total material cost of the firm.14 This reflects the standard trade-off that 
the fixed cost activity is undertaken provided that the scale of operation (here total 
spending on intermediate inputs) is sufficiently large.
12 We denote by m a generic source of imported intermediates, and hence   m can be thought of as an 
import-weighted exchange rate faced by the firms. The generalization of the model to multiple import source coun-
tries is straightforward; in the data, we measure   m as an import-weighted exchange rate at the firm level, as well as 
split imports by source country (see Section IIID).
13 This cost index is given by  C ∗ = ( V ∗ /ϕ ) ϕ ( W ∗ /(1 − ϕ) ) 1−ϕ with  V ∗ = exp  {  ∫ 0 1  γ  j log( V j ∗ / γ j ) d j } .
14 The marginal imported input satisfies  γ  j 0, i  log  b  j 0, i  · TM C i =  W ∗ f i , where the left-hand side is the incremental 
benefit proportional to the total material cost of the firm TM C i ≡ ϕ C ∗ Y i / [  B i ϕ Ω i ] and the cost-saving impact of 
additional imports  γ  j 0, i  log  b  j 0, i  .
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With this cost structure, the fraction of total variable cost spent on imported inter-
mediate inputs equals
(9)   φ i = ϕ ∫  0  j 0, i   γ j ( 1 −  b j −ζ ) d j,
where ϕ is the share of material cost in total variable cost and  γ j ( 1 −  b j −ζ  ) is the 
share of material cost spent on imports of type-j intermediate good for j ∈  J 0, i . We 
refer to  φ i as the import intensity of the firm, and it is one of the characteristics of 
the firm we measure directly in the data.
Finally, holding the set of imported varieties  J 0, i constant, this cost structure 
results in the following marginal cost:
(10)  M C i ∗ =  C  ∗ /[ B i ϕ Ω i ].
The partial elasticity of this marginal cost with respect to the exchange rate 
 m equals the expenditure share of the firm on imported intermediate inputs, 
 φ i = ∂ log M C i ∗ /∂ log   m , which emphasizes the role of import intensity in the anal-
ysis that follows.
We summarize these results in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: (i) Within sectors, firms with larger total material cost or smaller 
fixed cost of importing have a larger import intensity,  φ i . (ii) The partial elasticity 
of the marginal cost of the firm with respect to the (import-weighted) exchange rate 
equals  φ i .
C. Equilibrium Relationships
We now combine the ingredients introduced above to derive the optimal price 
setting of the firm, as well as the equilibrium determinants of the market share and 
import intensity of the firm. Consider firm i supplying an exogenously given set  K i 
of destination markets k. The firm sets destination-specific prices by solving
   max    Y i ,{ P k, i ,  Q k, i } k  {  ∑ k∈ K i      k  P k, i  Q k, i −   C  ∗  _  B i ϕ Ω i   Y i } ,
subject to  Y i =  ∑ k∈ K i     Q k, i and demand equation (1) in each destination k. We quote 
the destination-k price  P k, i in the units of destination-k local currency and use the 
bilateral nominal exchange rate   k to convert the price to the producer currency, 
denoting with  P k, i ∗ ≡   k  P k, i the producer-currency price of the firm for destination k. 
An increase in   k corresponds to the depreciation of the producer currency. The 
total cost is quoted in units of producer currency.15 Note that we treat the choice 
of the set of imported goods  J 0, i and the associated fixed costs as sunk by the price 
setting stage when the uncertainty about exchange rates is realized. The problem 
15 We do not explicitly model variable trade costs, but if they take an iceberg form, they are without loss of gen-
erality absorbed into the  ξ  k, i  D k term in the firm-i demand (1) in destination k.
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of  choosing  J 0, i under this circumstance is defined and characterized in the online 
Appendix and Section IIB provides empirical evidence supporting this assumption.
The firm optimally sets prices in each of its destination markets according to
(11)   P k, i ∗ =   σ k, i  _  σ k, i − 1 M C i 
∗ , k ∈  K i ,
where M C i ∗ is the marginal cost as defined in (10) and   k, i ≡  σ k, i /( σ k, i − 1) is 
the multiplicative markup with the effective demand elasticity  σ k, i defined in (3). 
This set of optimality conditions together with the constraints fully characterizes 
the allocation of the firm, given industry-level variables. In the online Appendix, we 
exploit these equilibrium conditions to derive how relative market shares and import 
intensities are determined in equilibrium across firms, and since these results are 
very intuitive, here we provide only a brief summary.
We show that other things equal and under mild regularity conditions, a firm with 
higher productivity  Ω i , higher quality/demand  ξ k, i , lower fixed cost of importing  f i , 
and serving a larger set of destinations  K i has a larger market share  S k, i and a higher 
import intensity  φ i . Intuitively, a more productive or high-demand firm has a larger 
market share and hence operates on a larger scale, which justifies paying the fixed 
cost for a larger set of imported intermediate inputs,  J 0, i . This makes the firm more 
import intensive, enhancing its productivity advantage through the cost-reduction 
effect of imports (larger  B i in (8)). This implies that, independently of the specifics 
of the general equilibrium environment, we should expect market shares and import 
intensities to be positively correlated in the cross section of firms, a pattern that we 
document in the data in Section II.
D. Imported Inputs, Market Share, and Pass-Through
We are now in a position to relate the firm’s exchange rate pass-through into its 
export prices with its market share and import intensity. The starting point for this 
analysis is the optimal price setting equation (11), which we rewrite as a full log 
differential:
(12)  d log  P k, i ∗ = d log   k, i + d log M C i ∗ .
Consider first the markup term. Using (2)–(4), we have
(13)  d log   k, i = − Γ k, i (d log  P k, i − d log  P s, k ) +   Γ k, i  _ ρ − 1 d log  ξ k, i ,
where converting the export price to local currency yields d log  P k, i = d log  P k, i ∗ − 
d log   k , and we now make explicit the subscript s to indicate that  P s, k is the 
 industry-destination-specific price index. The markup declines in the relative 
price of the firm and increases in the firm’s demand shock. From Proposition 1, 
Γ k, i is increasing in the firm’s market share, and hence price increases for larger 
 market-share firms are associated with larger declines in the markup.
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Next, the change in the marginal cost in equation  (10) can be decomposed 
as follows:
(14)  d log M C i ∗ =  φ i d log    m  
_ Us  _ _ V s ∗  + d log  
 C s ∗ _ _ Ωs  +  ϵ i 
MC .
This expression generalizes the result of Proposition 2 on the role of import inten-
sity  φ i by providing the full decomposition of the change in the log marginal cost. 
Here  
_ U s and  
_ V s ∗ are the price indexes for the imported intermediates (in foreign 
currency) and domestic intermediates (in producer currency), respectively. The sub-
script s emphasizes that these indexes can be specific to sector s in which firm i oper-
ates. Finally, d log  _ C s ∗/ _ Ωs is the log change in the industry-average marginal cost 
for a firm that does not import any intermediates, and  ϵ  i MC is a firm- idiosyncratic 
residual term defined explicitly in the online Appendix and assumed orthogonal to 
the exchange rate.16
Combining and manipulating equations (12)–(14), we prove our key theoretical 
result:
PROPOSITION 3: In any general equilibrium, the first-order approximation to the 
exchange rate pass-through elasticity into producer-currency export prices of the 
firm is given by
(15)   Ψ k, i ∗ ≡ E  { d log  P k, i ∗ _ d log   k  } =  α s, k +  β s, k  φ i +  γ s, k  S k, i ,
where ( α s, k ,  β s, k ,  γ s, k ) are sector-destination specific and depend only on average 
moments of equilibrium comovement between aggregate variables common to all 
firms.
The pass-through elasticity  Ψ k, i ∗ measures the equilibrium log change of the 
 destination-k producer-currency price of firm i relative to the log change in the bilat-
eral exchange rate, averaged across all possible states of the world and shocks that 
hit the economy.17 Under this definition, the pass-through elasticity is a measure of 
equilibrium comovement between the price of the firm and the exchange rate, and 
not a partial equilibrium response to an exogenous movement in the exchange rate. 
Thus, we do not need to assume that movements in exchange rates are exogenous, 
nor do we rely on any source of exogenous variation in our estimation. In fact, 
16 This orthogonality assumption is necessary for Proposition 3, and it holds provided that firm idiosyncratic 
shocks are not systematically correlated with exchange rate movements. More precisely, we allow firm demand, 
productivity, and import prices to move with exchange rates in arbitrary ways, but we require that the relative 
demand, productivity, and import prices of any two firms within sector-destination do not systematically change 
with exchange rate movements.
17 Formally, the expectation in (15) is over all possible exogenous shocks that affect the exchange rate in general 
equilibrium, as well as over all state variables (e.g., the distribution of firm productivities). Further, the expectation 
in (15) is conditional on the persistent characteristics of a given firm ( Ω i ,  ξ k,i ,  f i ), which, as Proposition 3 empha-
sizes, affect the firm’s pass-through only through the sufficient statistic ( φ i ,  S k,i ).
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we allow for arbitrary equilibrium comovement between exchange rates and other 
aggregate variables, including price and cost indexes.
Proposition 3 shows that we can relate firm-level pass-through to market share 
and import intensity of the firm, which form a sufficient statistic for cross-sectional 
variation in pass-through within sector-destination, independently of the specifics 
of the general equilibrium environment and, in particular, independently of what 
shocks hit the economy and shape the dynamics of the exchange rate. This relation-
ship is the focus of our empirical investigation in the next section. The values of 
the coefficients in this relationship ( α s, k ,  β s, k ,  γ s, k ) are sector-destination specific, 
and, although they depend on the general equilibrium environment in which firms 
 operate, we show in Section IIIA that we can directly estimate them in the data with-
out imposing any general equilibrium assumptions.18
Furthermore, the theory provides closed form expressions for the coefficients in 
(15). The coefficients  α s, k and  γ s, k depend on the unconditional moments of equi-
librium comovement between the exchange rate and aggregate variables such as the 
price index in the destination market and the domestic cost index (see the online 
Appendix). For example, pass-through into destination prices is lower (i.e.,  α s, k is 
higher) in an equilibrium environment where the domestic cost index offsets some 
of the effects of the exchange rate on marginal costs. And pass-through is relatively 
lower (i.e.,  γ s, k is higher) for large market-share firms when the destination price 
index responds weakly to the exchange rate, because of the stronger strategic com-
plementarities in their price setting.
The closed form expression for  β s, k highlights the structural determinants of the 
relationship between pass-through and import intensity:
(16)   β s, k =  1 _ 
1 +  _ Γs, k  E  { d log   m  _d log   k   ·  d log (  m  _ U s / _ V s ∗)  __ d log   m   } ,
where  
_ Γs, k is the markup elasticity evaluated at some average measure of market 
share  
_ S s, k . Intuitively,  β s, k depends on the comovement between export and import 
exchange rates and the pass-through of import exchange rate into the relative price of 
imported intermediates, as reflected by the two terms inside the expectation in (16). 
Indeed, import intensity proxies for the marginal cost correlation with the export 
exchange rate only to the extent that import and export exchange rates are corre-
lated and movements in the import exchange rate are associated with the changes 
in the import prices of the intermediate inputs. Importantly, we do not restrict the 
exchange rate pass-through into import prices to be complete. In our empirical work, 
we directly examine our theoretical mechanism by using the variation in exchange 
rate correlation and import price pass-through across import source countries.
Proposition 3 predicts that pass-through into destination-currency prices, equal 
to (1 −  Ψ k, i ∗ ), is lower for more import-intensive firms and for firms with higher 
18 We estimate the coefficients by exploiting the cross-sectional variation in the panel data within industries and 
destinations in the responses to shocks across firms. These estimates, however, are not suitable for undertaking 
counterfactuals across general equilibrium environments, as when the source of variation in exchange rate changes, 
so do the coefficients. Such counterfactuals need to be carried out in the context of a specific calibrated general 
equilibrium model.
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destination market share, provided  β s, k and  γ s, k are positive.19 Although theoreti-
cally these coefficients can have either sign (or equal to zero), we expect them to 
be positive, and this is what we find in the data. Intuitively, a more import-intensive 
firm is effectively hedged from a domestic currency appreciation via decreasing 
import prices and hence keeps its destination-currency price more stable. Further, a 
high-market-share firm has a lower pass-through as it chooses to accommodate the 
marginal cost shocks with a larger markup adjustment as opposed to a larger move-
ment in its destination-currency price.
II. Data and Stylized Facts
In this section we describe the dataset that we use for our empirical analysis and 
the basic stylized facts on exporters and importers.
A. Data Description and Construction of Variables
Our main data source is the National Bank of Belgium, which provided a com-
prehensive panel of Belgian trade flows by firm, product (CN 8-digit level), exports 
by destination, and imports by source country. We merge these data, using a unique 
firm identifier, with firm-level characteristics from the Belgian Business Registry, 
comprising information on firms’ inputs, which we use to construct total variable 
cost measures and total factor productivity estimates. Our sample includes annual 
data for the period 2000 to 2008, beginning the year after the euro was introduced. 
We focus on manufacturing exports to the OECD countries outside the euro zone: 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, account-
ing for 58 percent of total non-euro exports.20 We also include a robustness test with 
the full set of non-euro destinations. We provide a detailed description of all the data 
sources in the online data Appendix.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the log change in a firm f ’s export price 
of good i to destination country k at time t, proxied by the change in a firm’s export 
unit value, defined as the ratio of export values to export quantities:
(17)  Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ ≡ Δ log  ( Export valu e f, i, k, t   __ Export quantit y f, i, k, t  ) ,
where quantities are measured as weights or units. We use the change in the ratio of 
value to weights, where available, and the change in the ratio of value to units other-
wise. We note that unit values are an imprecise proxy for prices because there may 
19 Note that Proposition 3 provides a linear approximation (15) to the generally nonlinear equilibrium relationship. 
In the data, we test directly for the nonlinearity in this relationship and find no statistically significant evidence. Our 
interpretation is that this is not because nonlinearities are unimportant in general, but because these finer features of the 
equilibrium relationship are less robust across broad industries that we consider in our analysis. This is why we choose 
to focus on the first-order qualitative prediction of the theory captured by the approximation in (15).
20 The euro zone was formed on January 1, 1999, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined on January 1, 2001, Slovenia joined in 
2007, Cyprus and Malta joined in 2008. We also exclude Denmark from the set of export destinations because its 
exchange rate hardly moves relative to the euro.
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be more than one distinct product within a CN 8-digit code despite the high degree 
of disaggregation constituting close to 10,000 distinct manufacturing product cat-
egories over the sample period. Some price changes may be due to compositional 
changes within a product code or due to errors in measuring quantities.21 To try to 
minimize this problem, we drop all year-to-year unit value changes of plus 200 per-
cent or minus 67 percent (around 7 percent of the observations).
A distinctive feature of these data that is critical for our analysis is that they also 
contain firm-level import values and quantities for each CN 8-digit product code by 
source country. We include all 234 source countries and all 13,000 product codes 
in the sample. Studies that draw on price data have not been able to match import 
and export prices at the firm level. In general, many firms engaged in exporting also 
import their intermediate inputs. In Belgium, around 80 percent of manufacturing 
exporters import some of their inputs. We use these data to construct three key vari-
ables—the import intensity from outside the euro zone  φ f, t , the log change in the 
marginal cost Δ m c f, t ∗ , and the firm’s market share  S f, s, k, t . Specifically,
(18)   φ f, t ≡  Total non-euro import valu e  f, t    ___  Total variable cost s  f, t  , 
where total variable costs comprise a firm’s total wage bill and total material cost. 
We often average this measure over time to obtain a firm-level average import inten-
sity denoted by  φ f .
The change in marginal cost is defined as the log change in unit values of firm 
imports from all source countries weighted by respective expenditure shares:
(19)  Δ m c f, t ∗ ≡  ∑ 
j∈ J f, t 
 
 
   ∑ 
m∈ M f, t 
 
 
  ω f, j, m, t Δ log  U f, j, m, t ∗ ,
where  U f, j, m, t ∗ is the euro price (unit value) of firm f ’s imports of intermediate good j 
from country m at time t, the weights  ω f, j, m, t are the average of period t and t − 1 
shares of respective import values in the firm’s total variable costs, and  J f, t and  M f, t 
denote the set of all imported goods and import source countries (including inside 
the euro zone) for the firm at a given time. Note that this measure of the marginal 
cost is still a proxy since it does not reflect the costs of domestic inputs and firm 
productivity. We control separately for estimated firm productivity and average firm 
wage rate, however, detailed data on the prices and values of domestic inputs are 
not available. Nonetheless, controlling for our measure of the firm-level marginal 
cost is a substantial improvement over previous pass-through studies that typically 
control only for the aggregate manufacturing wage rate or producer price level. 
21 This is the typical drawback of customs data (as, for example, is also the case with the French dataset used in 
Berman, Martin, and Mayer 2012), where despite the richness of firm-level variables, we do not observe trade prices 
of individual items. As a result, there are two potential concerns: one, aggregation across heterogeneous goods even 
at the very fine level of disaggregation (firm-destination CN 8-digit product code level); and, two, aggregation over 
time of sticky prices. This means we cannot condition our analysis on a price change of a good, as was done in 
Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) using BLS IPP item-level data. The BLS data, however, is limited in the 
available firm characteristics and hence is not suitable for our analysis. We address these two caveats by conducting 
a number of robustness tests and providing a cautious interpretation of our findings in Section IIIE.
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Furthermore, our measure of marginal cost arguably captures the component of the 
marginal cost most sensitive to exchange rate movements.
Ideally, we would like to construct  φ f, t and Δ m c f, t ∗ for each of the products i a firm 
produces; however, this measure is available only at the firm-f level, which may not 
be the same for all of the products produced by multiproduct firms. To address this 
multiproduct issue, we keep only the firm’s main export products, which we identify 
using Belgium’s input-output table for the year 2005, comprising 56 IO manufactur-
ing codes. For each firm, we identify an IO code that accounts for its largest export 
value over the whole sample period and keep only the CN 8-digit products within 
this major-IO code. The objective is to keep only the set of products for each firm 
that have similar production technologies. This leaves us with 60  percent of the 
observations but 90 percent of the value of exports. We also present results with the 
full set of export products and experiment with defining the major product using 
more disaggregated product lines, such as HS 4-digit.22 Further, it is possible that 
some of the firm’s imports might be final goods rather than intermediate inputs. 
We attempt to identify imported intermediate inputs using a number of different 
approaches. First, we omit any import from the construction of  φ f, t that is defined as 
a final product using Broad Economic Codes (BEC). Second, we construct  φ f using 
only the intermediate inputs for a given industry according to the IO tables.
The last key variable in our analysis is a firm’s market share, which we construct 
as follows:
(20)   S f, s, k, t ≡  Export valu e  f, s, k, t   __    ∑  f ′ ∈ F s, k, t  
  Export valu e  f ′ , s, k, t  ,
where s is the sector in which firm f sells product i and  F s, k, t is the set of Belgian 
firms that export to destination k, in sector s at time t. Therefore,  S f, s, k, t measures 
a Belgium firm’s market share in sector s, export destination k at time t relative to 
all other Belgium exporters. Note that, following the theory, this measure is des-
tination specific. The theory also suggests that the relevant measure is the firm’s 
market share relative to all firms supplying the destination market in a given sector, 
including exporters from other countries as well as domestic competitors in mar-
ket k. But, since our analysis is across Belgian exporters within sector-destinations, 
the competitive stance in a particular sector-destination is common for all Belgian 
exporters, and hence our measure of  S f, s, k, t captures all relevant variation for our 
analysis (see Section IIIA).23 We define sectors at the HS 4-digit level, at which we 
22 By only keeping the firm’s major products, we also deal with the potential problem of including products that 
firms export but do not produce—a phenomenon referred to as carry-along trade (Bernard et al. 2012). As a further 
robustness check, in Section IIIE we use IO tables to isolate the inputs that are used in the production of firms’ 
major products, and only use these inputs to construct the firm’s import intensity variable. See De Loecker et al. 
(2012) for an alternative structural treatment of multiproduct firms.
23 In an extension of the theory, a multiproduct firm facing a nested-CES demand (1) sets the same markup for all 
its varieties within a sector, as in (11), where its markup depends on the cumulative market share of all these variet-
ies. Therefore,  S f, s, k, t is indeed the appropriate measure of market power for all varieties i exported by firm f to 
destination k in sector s at time t. See Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro, and Vichyanond (2013) for a study of pass-through 
of multiproduct firms under an alternative demand structure.
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both obtain a nontrivial distribution of market shares and avoid having too many 
 sector-destinations served by a single firm.24
B. Stylized Facts About Exporters and Importers
A salient pattern in our dataset is that most exporters are also importers, a pat-
tern also present in many earlier studies cited in the introduction. As reported in 
Table 1, in the full sample of Belgian manufacturing firms, the fraction of firms 
that are either exporters or importers is 33 percent. Out of these firms, 57 percent 
both import and export, 27 percent only import, and 16 percent only export. That is, 
24 percent of manufacturing firms in Belgium export and 78 percent of exporters 
also import.25 This high correlation between exporting and importing suggests that 
the selection into both activities is driven by the same firm characteristics, such as 
productivity, which determines the scale of operations. We show how this overlap 
in importing and exporting activities turns out to be important for understanding the 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through.
Interestingly, the data reveal a lot of heterogeneity within exporting firms, which 
are an already very select subsample of firms. The large differences between export-
ers and nonexporters are already well-known and are also prevalent in our data. 
The new stylized facts we highlight here are the large differences within exporters 
between high- and low-import-intensity exporting firms. We show in Table 2 that 
these two groups of exporting firms differ in fundamental ways. We report  various 
firm-level characteristics for high- and low-import-intensity exporters, splitting 
exporters into two groups based on the median import intensity outside the euro 
zone ( φ f ) equal to 4.2 percent.26 For comparison, we also report the available analo-
gous statistics for nonexporting firms with at least five employees.
24 The median of  S f, s, k, t is 7.8 percent, yet the seventy-fifth percentile is over 40 percent and the  export-value-weighted 
median is 55 percent. Twenty-four percent of  S f, s, k, t observations are less than 1 percent, yet these observations account 
for only 1.4 percent of export sales. Three percent of  S f, s, k, t observations are unity, yet they account for less than 
2.5  percent. Our results are robust (and, in fact, become marginally stronger) to the exclusion of observations with very 
small and very large market shares. We depict the cumulative distribution function of  S f, s, k, t in Figure A1 in the online 
Appendix.
25 These statistics are averaged over the sample length, but they are very stable year-to-year. In the subsample of 
exporters we use for our regression analysis in Section IIIB, the fraction of importing firms is somewhat higher at 
85.5 percent, reflecting the fact that data availability is slightly biased toward larger firms.
26 The unit of observation here is a firm-year. If we split our sample based on firm-product-destination-year 
(which is the unit of observation in our regression analysis), the median import intensity is higher at 8.2 percent, 
however, this has no material consequences for the patterns we document in Table 2.
Table 1—Exporter and Importer Incidence ( percent)
Exporters and/or importers All exporters
Fraction of all firms 32.6 23.7
 Among them
  exporters and importers 57.0 78.4
  only exporters 15.8 21.6
  only importers 27.2 —
Notes: The data include all manufacturing firms. The frequencies are averaged over the years 
2000–2008.
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From Table  2, we see that import-intensive exporters operate on a larger 
scale and are more productive. The share of imported inputs in total variable 
costs for  import-intensive exporters is 37  percent compared to 17  percent for 
 nonimport-intensive exporters, and similarly for imports sourced outside the euro 
zone it is 17 percent compared to 1.2 percent. And of course, these numbers are much 
lower for nonexporters at 1.6 percent for imports outside Belgium and 0.3 percent 
for imports outside the euro zone. Import-intensive exporters are 2.5 times larger 
in employment than nonimport-intensive exporters and 13 times larger than nonex-
porters; they pay a 15 percent wage premium relative to nonimport-intensive firms 
and a 40 percent wage premium relative to nonexporters. Similarly,  import-intensive 
exporters have much larger total material costs, total factor productivity, and market 
share. These firms also export and import on a much larger scale, and are more likely 
to trade with more distant countries outside the euro zone. These firms import more 
in terms of total value, number of imported goods, and from a larger set of import 
source countries. These results highlight that both types of exporting firms are active 
in importing from a range of countries both within and outside the euro zone but 
that the two types of firms differ substantially in import intensity, consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical framework.
We now provide more details on the distribution of import intensity outside the 
euro zone ( φ f ). We see that the distribution of import intensity among exporters 
in Table 3, although somewhat skewed toward zero, has a wide support and sub-
stantial variation, which we exploit in our regression analysis in Section III. Over 
24 percent of exporters do not import from outside the euro zone, yet they account 







Share of imports in total cost
  All imports 0.37 0.17 0.02
  Non-euro imports ( φ f ) 0.17 0.01 0.00
Employment (number of workers) 270.6 112.2 20.7
Average wage rate 48.8 42.3 34.9
Material cost 103.3 28.2 3.0
Total factor productivity (log) 0.33 0.07 —
Total exports (manufacturing) 66.5 14.1
 to non-euro OECD 14.4 2.4
Total imports (all products) 49.3 6.8
 outside euro zone 20.8 0.5
Number of import source countries 14.4 6.6
Number of HS-8 products imported 79.3 38.2
Notes: The exporter subsample is split at the median of non-euro import intensity (share of non-
euro imports in total costs) equal to 4.2 percent. The nonexporter subsample is all nonexport-
ing manufacturing firms with five or more employees. Material cost, import, and export values 
are in millions of euros, and average wage rate is in thousands of euros.  Twenty-eight percent 
of low import intensity firms do not import at all, and 33 percent of them do not import from 
outside the euro zone. The construction of the measured TFP is described in the online data 
Appendix.
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share of imported inputs in total costs ranges between 0 and 10 percent, while the 
 export-value-weighted median of import intensity is 13 percent. At the same time, 
nearly 28 percent of export sales are generated by the firms with import intensity 
in excess of 30  percent.27 We further depict the cumulative distribution function 
of import intensity  φ f in Figure A1 in the online Appendix, which also provides a 
cumulative distribution function for our market share variable  S f, s, k, t .
Table 4 displays the correlations of import intensity with other firm-level variables 
in the cross section of firms. Confirming the predictions of Section IC, import inten-
sity is positively correlated with market share, as well as with firm TFP, employment, 
and revenues. The strongest correlate of import intensity is the total material cost of 
the firm, consistent with the predictions of Proposition 2. Overall, the correlations 
in Table 4 broadly support the various predictions of our  theoretical framework. At 
the same time, although import intensity and market share are positively correlated 
with productivity and other firm performance measures, there is sufficient indepen-
dent variation to enable us to distinguish between the determinants of incomplete 
 pass-through in the following subsections.
27 While the unweighted distribution (firm count) has a single peak, the export-value-weighted distribution has 
two peaks. This is due to the fact that one exporter with  φ f = 0.33 accounts for almost 14 percent of export sales. 
Our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of this largest exporter, which accounts for only 134 observations out 
of a total of over 90,000 firm-destination-product-year observations in our sample.




Fraction of export value
(percent)
 φ f  = 0 717 24.9 1.4
0 <  φ f ≤ 0.1 1,478 51.3 38.2
0.1 <  φ f ≤ 0.2 348 12.1 23.8
0.2 <  φ f ≤ 0.3 155 5.4 8.8
0.3 <  φ f ≤ 0.4 94 3.3 23.0 φ f > 0.4 89 3.1 4.9
Note: Import intensity,  φ f , is the share of imported intermediate inputs from outside the euro 
zone in the total variable cost of the firm, averaged over the sample period.
Table 4—Correlation Structure of Import Intensity
Import
intensity TFP Revenues Employment
Material
cost
Market share 0.16 0.20 0.28 0.25 0.27
Material cost 0.23 0.70 0.99 0.83
Employment 0.10 0.60 0.86
Revenues 0.21 0.72
TFP 0.15
Notes: Cross-sectional correlations of firm-level variables averaged over time. Material costs, 
employment, revenues, and TFP are in logs. Import intensity is the share of imported inter-
mediate inputs from outside the euro zone in the total cost of the firm. Market share corre-
sponds to our measure  S f, s, k, t , defined in (20), aggregated to the firm-level by averaging across 
sector-destination-years.
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We close this section with a brief discussion of the patterns of time-series varia-
tion in import intensity for a given firm. Import intensity appears to be a relatively 
stable characteristic of the firm, moving little over time and in response to exchange 
rate fluctuations. Specifically, the simple regression of  φ f, t on firm fixed effects has 
an  R 2 of over 85 percent, implying that the cross-sectional variation in  time-averaged 
firm import intensity  φ f is nearly six times larger than the average time-series varia-
tion in  φ f, t for a given firm. When we regress the change in  φ f, t on firm fixed effects 
and the lags of the log change in firm-level import-weighted exchange rates, the 
contemporaneous effect is significant with a semi-elasticity of only 0.057, and with 
offsetting, albeit marginally significant, lag effects. That is, a 10 percent deprecia-
tion of the euro temporarily increases import intensity by 0.57 of a percentage point. 
Furthermore, we find that the firm hardly adjusts its imports on the extensive margin 
in response to changes in its import-weighted exchange rate.28 All of this evidence 
provides support for our assumption in Section I that the set of imported goods is a 
sunk decision at the horizons we consider, and hence the extensive  margin plays a 
very limited role in the response of a firm’s marginal cost to exchange rate move-
ments, justifying the use of  φ f as a time-invariant firm characteristic in the empirical 
regressions that follow.
To summarize, we find substantial variation in import intensity among export-
ers, and this heterogeneity follows patterns consistent with the predictions of our 
theoretical framework. Next, guided by the theoretical predictions, we explore the 
implications of this heterogeneity for the exchange rate pass-through patterns across 
Belgian firms.
III. Empirical Evidence
This section presents our main empirical results. We start by introducing and 
estimating our main empirical specification. We then provide nonparametric evi-
dence and explore the forces behind our empirical results, confirming the specific 
mechanisms identified by the theory. We conclude with a battery of robustness 
tests.
A. Empirical Specification
We now turn to the empirical estimation of the relationship between import 
intensity, market share, and pass-through in the cross section of exporters 
(Proposition 3). The theoretical pass-through regression equation (15) cannot be 
directly estimated since pass-through  Ψ k, i ∗ is not a variable that can be observed 
in the data. Therefore, we step back to the decomposition of the log price change 
in equations (12)–(14), which we again linearize in import intensity and market 
share. After replacing differentials with changes over time Δ, we arrive at our 
main empirical specification, where we regress the annual change in log export 
28 We measure the extensive margin as the change in firm imports due to adding a new variety or dropping an 
existing variety at CN 8-digit-country level.
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price on the change in the log exchange rate, interacted with import intensity and 
market share:
(21)  Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗   = [ α s, k + β  φ f, t−1 +  ˜ γ  S f, s, k, t−1 ]Δ  e k, t 
  +  δ  s, k + b  φ f, t−1 + c  S f, s, k, t−1 +  ˜ u f, i, k, t , 
where  p f, i, k, t ∗ is the log euro producer price to destination k (as opposed to 
 local-currency price), and an increase in the log nominal exchange rate,  e k, t , cor-
responds to the bilateral depreciation of the euro relative to the destination-k cur-
rency.29 In our analysis we estimate parameters β and  ˜  γ with values averaged across 
sector-destination-years. In order to keep the pool of averaged coefficients ( β s, k ,  γ s, k ) 
relatively homogenous, we focus on manufacturing exports to  high-income OECD 
countries in our benchmark specifications. The regression equation (21) is a struc-
tural relationship that emerges from the theoretical model of Section I, and  S f, s, k, t−1 
corresponds to our measure of market share defined in equation (20). Under a mild 
assumption that Δ  e k, t is uncorrelated with ( φ f, t−1 ,  S f, s, k, t−1 ), we prove the following 
proposition in the online Appendix:
PROPOSITION 4: The OLS estimates of β and  ˜  γ in (21) identify the weighted 
averages across sector-destination-years of  β s, k and  γ s, k   Ss, k, t−1 respectively, 
where   Ss, k, t−1 is the sector-destination-time-specific cumulative market share of all 
Belgian exporters and ( β s, k ,  γ s, k ) are the theoretical coefficients in the pass-through 
relationship (15).
This result shows that, despite the fact that we cannot directly estimate the theo-
retical regression (15), we can nonetheless identify the theoretical coefficients in the 
relationship between pass-through, import intensity, and market share. Furthermore, 
it formally confirms the validity of our measure of the market share relative to other 
Belgian exporters.
Equation  (21) is our benchmark empirical specification. Note that it is very 
demanding in that it requires including sector-destination dummies and their inter-
actions with exchange rate changes at a very disaggregated level. Therefore, we 
start by estimating equation (21) with a common coefficient α, and later replace 
sector-destination fixed effects  δ  s, k with sector-destination-year fixed effects  δ  s, k, t 
which absorb  α s, k Δ  e k, t .We also estimate (21) for exports to a single destination (United States) only. In our main regressions we replace  φ f, t−1 with a time-invariant φ f to reduce the measurement error, and also to maximize the size of the sample 
since some of the lagged  φ f, t−1 were unavailable. This has little effect on the results 
since, as we show,  φ f, t is very persistent over time. In the main specifications we also 
replace  S f, s, k, t−1 with the contemporaneous  S f, s, k, t , as both give the same results.30 In 
the robustness section we report the estimates from the specification with the lagged 
φ f, t−1 and  S f, s, k, t−1 .
29 The nominal exchange rates are average annual rates from the IMF. These are provided for each country rela-
tive to the US dollar, which we convert to be relative to the euro.
30 We do not use the time-averaged market share as firms move in and out of sector-destinations over time.
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B. Main Empirical Findings
To explore the underlying mechanisms behind the equilibrium relationship 
between pass-through, import intensity, and market shares, we begin with a more 
simple specification and build up to the specification in equation  (21). Table  5 
reports the results. We include industry-destination specific effects (where industry 
is defined at the HS 4-digit level) to be consistent with the theory, and year effects to 
control for common marginal cost variation. First, in column 1, we report that at the 
annual horizon the unweighted average exchange rate pass-through elasticity into 
producer prices in our sample is 0.2, or, equivalently, 0.8 (= 1 − 0.2) into destina-
tion prices. We refer to it as 80 percent pass-through.
In column 2, we include an interaction between exchange rates and a firm’s import 
intensity. We see that the simple average coefficient reported in column 1 masks 
a considerable amount of heterogeneity, as firms with different import intensities 
have very different pass-through rates. Firms with a high share of imported inputs 
relative to total variable costs exhibit lower pass-through into destination-currency 
export prices—a 10 percentage point higher import intensity is associated with a 
6  percentage point lower pass-through. A typical firm with zero import intensity has 
a pass-through of 87 percent (= 1 − 0.13), while a firm with a 38 percent import 
intensity (in the ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution) has a pass-through of only 
64 percent (= 1 − 0.13 − 0.60 · 0.38).
Table 5—Import Intensity, Market Share, and Pass-Through
Dependent variable:
Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ  e k, t 0.203*** 0.127*** 0.157*** 0.149*** 0.098*** 0.057* —(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f 0.604*** 0.370*** 0.341* 0.263** 0.473*** 0.470** (0.112) (0.117) (0.201) (0.115) (0.104) (0.236)
Δ  e k, t ·  S f, s, k, t 0.238*** 0.284*** 0.299*** (0.060) (0.063) (0.100)
Δ m c f, t ∗ 0.512*** 0.506*** (0.030) (0.031)
Fixed effects:
  δ  s, k +  δ  t Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
  δ  s, k, t No No No No No No Yes
  δ  f, i, t +  δ  k No No No Yes No No No
Observations 93,395 93,395 93,395 93,395 93,395 93,395 93,395
 R 2 0.057 0.057 0.062 0.487 0.062 0.057 0.344
Notes: Observations are at the firm-destination-product-year level. Δ  corresponds to annual changes. Columns 2–3 
and 5–7 include a control for the level of  φ f , and columns 5–7 also include a control for the level of the mar-
ket share,  S f, s, k, t . Fixed effects:  δ  s, k +  δ  t is the combination of sector-destination and year fixed effects;  δ  s, k, t are 
 sector- destination-year fixed effects;  δ  f, i, t +  δ  k is the combination of firm-product-year and country fixed effects (the sector is defined at HS-4 and the product at HS-8-digit level). The results without the year fixed effects are 
almost identical. Standard errors are clustered at the country-year level, reported in brackets. Alternative clustering 
at the firm level and at the country-HS-4-digit level yield the same conclusions.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Next, we explore whether import intensity operates through the marginal-cost 
channel or through selection and the markup channel. In columns 3 and 4, we add 
 controls for the marginal cost of the firm to see whether the effect of import  intensity 
on  pass-through persists beyond the marginal cost channel. In column 3, we control 
for the change in marginal cost Δ m c f, t ∗ , measured as the import-weighted change in 
the firm’s import prices of material inputs (see equation (19)), which is likely to be 
sensitive to exchange rate changes if the firm relies heavily on imported intermedi-
ate inputs. Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that the coefficient on the import 
intensity interaction nearly halves in size once we control for marginal cost, drop-
ping from 0.6 to 0.37, but still remains strongly significant with a t-stat of 3.2. 
We confirm this finding with an alternative control for marginal cost changes, by 
including firm-product-year fixed effects ( δ  f, i, t ) in column 4. In this specification, 
the only variation that remains is across destinations for a given firm and hence, 
among other things, controls for all components of the marginal cost of the firms.31 
The coefficient on the import intensity interaction in column 4 is almost the same as 
that in column 3, but much less precisely estimated with a t-stat of 1.7. This result 
is impressive, given that this specification is saturated with fixed effects, and the 
similarity of the results in columns 3 and 4 provides confidence in our measure of 
marginal cost.
The results in columns 3 and 4 suggest that, although the marginal cost is an impor-
tant channel through which import intensity affects pass-through (see Proposition 2), 
there is still a considerable residual effect operating through the markup channel 
after conditioning on the marginal cost. This finding is consistent with the theo-
retical predictions, since import intensity correlates with market share in the cross 
section of firms and market share determines the markup elasticity, causing omitted 
variable bias. To see this, in column 5 we augment the specification of column 3 
(controlling for Δ m c f, t ∗ ) with a market share interaction with the log change in 
exchange rate to proxy for markup elasticity, as suggested by Proposition 3. Given 
that we now control for both marginal cost and markup, we expect import intensity 
to stop having predictive power. Although the effect of import intensity does not dis-
appear completely, the coefficient does fall in size (from 0.37 to 0.26) and becomes 
less significant.32
Finally, column 6 implements our main specification in equation (21) by includ-
ing the import intensity and market share interactions, without controlling for mar-
ginal cost. Proposition 3 suggests that import intensity and market share are two 
prime predictors of exchange rate pass-through, and indeed we find that the two 
interaction terms in column  6 are strongly statistically significant. Interpreting 
our results quantitatively, we find that a firm with a zero import intensity and a 
nearly zero market share (corresponding respectively to the fifth percentiles of both 
31 Although firm-product-year fixed effects ( δ  f, i, t ) arguably provide the best possible control for marginal cost, 
the disadvantage of this specification is that it only exploits the variation across destinations and thus excludes all 
variation within industry destinations that is the main focus of our analysis. Consequently, we cannot use our mea-
sure of market share in specifications with  δ  f, i, t since our market share measure only makes sense within industry 
destinations, as we discuss in Section IIA.
32 The coefficient on Δ m c f, t ∗ in both specifications of columns 3 and 5 is remarkably stable at 0.51. The theory 
suggests that this coefficient should be 1/(1 +  _ Γ), that is the average pass-through elasticity of idiosyncratic shocks 
into prices, corresponding to an average markup elasticity of   
_ Γ ≈ 1, close to the estimates provided in Gopinath 
and Itskhoki (2011) using very different data and methods.
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 distributions) has a pass-through of 94 percent (= 1 − 0.06). Complete (100 per-
cent) pass-through for such firms cannot be rejected at the 95 percent confidence 
level. A hypothetical nonimporting firm with a 75 percent market share relative to 
other Belgian exporters within sector-destination (corresponding to the ninety-fifth 
percentile of the firm-level distribution of market shares) has a pass-through of 
73 percent, that is 21 percentage points (= 0.28 · 0.75) lower. Holding this market 
share constant and increasing the import intensity of the firm from zero to 38 per-
cent (corresponding again to the ninety-fifth percentile of the respective distribu-
tion) reduces the  pass-through by another 18 percentage points (= 0.47 · 0.38), to 
55 percent. Therefore, variation in import intensity and market share explains a vast 
range of variation in  pass-through across firms. The marginal cost channel (proxied 
by import intensity) and the markup channel (proxied by market share) contribute 
roughly equally to this variation in pass-through.
Column  7 concludes this analysis by estimating our main specification (as in 
 column 6) controlling for the industry-destination-year fixed effects ( δ  s, k, t ). Therefore, 
the only variation used in this estimation is within industry-destination- year, as sug-
gested by our theory in Section ID. In this regression, the coefficient on the exchange 
rate is effectively allowed to vary at the industry-destination level (i.e.,  α s, k ) but is 
absorbed in the fixed effects. Comparing columns  6 and 7, we see that the point 
estimates on the import intensity and market share barely change, and the estimates 
remain strongly statistically significant in column 7 despite thousands of fixed effects.
C. Nonparametric Results
Our main empirical findings in Table 5 provide strong support for the theoretical 
predictions developed in Section I. However, we want to ensure that these results are 
smooth (e.g., not driven by outliers) and are not artifacts of the linearized specifica-
tion. We re-estimate the specifications in Table 5 nonparametrically, by splitting the 
distribution of import intensity  φ f into quartiles. Specifically, we estimate a separate 
pass-through coefficient for each quartile of the import intensity distribution and 
plot these coefficients in Figure 1. All estimated coefficients, standard errors, and 
p-values are reported in Table A1 in the online Appendix. The graph shows that 
the coefficient is estimated to be monotonically higher (thus lower pass-through) 
as we move from low to higher import intensity bins when we do not include both 
marginal cost and market share controls. The steepest line corresponds to the uncon-
ditional regression (a counterpart to column 2 of Table 5), and is somewhat flatter 
with controls for marginal cost (column 3), and it is much flatter after controlling 
jointly for the change in the marginal cost and the market share interaction (col-
umn 5). The dashed line corresponds to our main specification (column 6), which 
controls for both market share and import intensity, but not marginal cost, and it also 
exhibits a considerable slope across the import intensity bins. Furthermore, in all of 
these cases the difference between the pass-through coefficient in the first and fourth 
quartiles is significant with a p-value of 1 percent, with the exception of when we 
control for both marginal cost and markup (market share interaction). In this case, 
consistent with the theory, the profile of pass-through coefficients across the bins of 
the import intensity distribution becomes nearly flat with the differences between 
the pass-through values in different bins statistically insignificant.
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An alternative nonparametric specification is to divide the observations by both 
import intensity and market share. In Table 6, we split all firms into low and high 
import intensity bins at the median import intensity, and all observations into 
low and high market share bins depending on whether the  firm-sector-destination 
market share is below or above the seventy-fifth  percentile of the market share 
 distribution within-sector-destination. With this split, roughly 50  percent of 
 firm-product-destination-year observations fall within each market share bin. For 
each of the four bins, we estimate a simple pass-through regression of the change 
in producer export prices on the change in the exchange rate. Consistent with the 
results in column 6 of Table 5, we find that pass-through into destination-currency 
export prices decreases significantly either as we move toward the bin with a 
higher market share or toward the bin with a higher import intensity. The lowest 
 pass-through of 66 percent (= 1 − 0.34) is found for the bin with high market share 
and above-median import intensity, compared with the pass-through of 87 percent 
(= 1 − 0.13) for firms with below-median import intensity and low market share, 
quantitatively consistent with the results in Table 5.
From Table 6, we see that there are more observations along the main diagonal 
(around 30 percent in each bin) relative to the inverse diagonal (around 20 percent 
in each bin), which is due to the positive correlation between the market share and 
the import intensity in the cross section of firms. This notwithstanding, the share of 
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Figure 1. Pass-Through by Quartile of Import Intensity
Notes: Equal-sized bins in terms of firm-product-destination-year observations, sorted by  φ f . 
The means of  φ f in the four bins are 1.3, 5.5, 13.1, and 30.1 percent, respectively. The figure 
reports pass-through coefficients of Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ on Δ  e k, t within each  φ f  quartile, where the regres-
sions include additional controls in levels and interacted with Δ  e k, t , as indicated in the legend 
of the figure, to parallel columns 2–3 and 5–6 of Table 5. The pass-through coefficient in Bin 4 
is significantly different from that in Bin 1 at the 1 percent level for all specifications except the 
third one (controlling for both Δ m c f, t ∗ and  S f, s, k, t ) for which it is not significant at the 5  percent 
level. Additional information is reported in Table A1 in the online Appendix.
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export value in the first bin with both low market share and low import intensity is 
only 8 percent. The fourth bin with both above-median import intensity and high 
market share accounts for the majority of exports, over 61 percent. This suggests that 
the pass-through coefficient into destination prices from a regression weighted by 
their respective export values should be substantially lower than from a regression 
in which observations are unweighted. Indeed, when weighting by export values, we 
find a pass-through coefficient of 62 percent, much lower than the 80 percent result 
in the unweighted specification (column 1 of Table 5). Our evidence further shows 
that part of this difference is due to greater markup variability among the large 
exporters, but of a quantitatively similar importance is the higher import intensity 
of these firms.
Finally, we explore the possibility of nonmonotonic and nonlinear effects of mar-
ket share and import intensity on pass-through by augmenting the main specifica-
tion in column 6 of Table 5 with second-order terms. We find that the coefficient 
on the squared market share term interacted with exchange rate is negative, but 
insignificant and small. Even using the point estimate, the estimated relationship 
between pass-through and market share remains monotonically increasing over the 
whole range [0, 1] of the market share variable, which confirms the theoretical 
prediction in Proposition 1. Further, although the coefficient on the interaction of 
import intensity with market share is positive, it is also small and insignificant. 
These results justify our focus on the linear specification of Table 5 (see discussion 
in footnote 19).
D. Deciphering the Mechanism
Now that we have established that high-import-intensive firms have lower 
 pass-through into export prices, we delve into the underlying mechanisms. According 
to the theory, higher import intensity is associated with higher marginal cost sensitiv-
ity to exchange rates (Proposition 2). We test this directly by regressing the change 
in the marginal cost Δ m c f, t ∗ on the change in the destination-specific exchange rate Δ  e k, t and separately on the change in the firm-level import-weighted exchange rate 
Table 6—Pass-Through by Import-Intensity and Market-Share Bins
Low import intensity High import intensity
Low market share 0.131*** 0.194***
 Fraction of observations 0.30 0.21
 Share in export value 0.08 0.10
High market share 0.214*** 0.339***
 Fraction of observations 0.20 0.29
 Share in export value 0.21 0.61
Notes: Coefficients from regression of Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ on Δ  e k, t in respective bins without fixed effects; 
bin-specific intercepts included (all estimated to be close to zero). Firms are sorted by import 
intensity  φ f into below and above median equal to 8.1  percent; and by market share  S f, s, k, t 
averaged across the years the firm served a given sector-destination into below and above the 
 seventy-fifth percentile within each sector (HS4)-destination, which ensures a roughly even num-
ber of firm-product-destination-year observations in each high and low category. The coefficient 
in the high-high bin is significantly different from the other coefficients at least at a 2 percent 
level.
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Δ  e f, t M, within each quartile of the import-intensity distribution.33 Figure 2, which 
plots these  coefficients, illustrates a very tight monotonically increasing pattern of 
marginal cost sensitivity to the destination-specific exchange rates across the bins 
with increasing import intensity (and columns 5 and 6 in Table A1 in the online 
Appendix report additional details). Quantitatively, an increase in import intensity 
from 1 percent on average in the first quartile to 30 percent on average in the fourth 
quartile leads to an increase in marginal cost sensitivity to the exchange rate from 
0.02 to 0.17. This variation is quantitatively consistent with the effects of import 
intensity on pass-through we studied earlier (see Figure  1). The response of the 
marginal cost to the import-weighted exchange rate is also monotonically increasing 
in  φ f and lies strictly above the response to the destination-specific exchange rate, 
ranging from 0.05 to 0.21.
The theory predicts the patterns depicted in Figure 2 hold when both the correla-
tion between export and import-weighted exchange rates and the pass-through into 
import prices are positive (see equations (14) and (16)). We now provide evidence 
for each of these two key structural determinants of the relationship between import 
intensity and pass-through. Column 7 of Table A1 shows there is a positive corre-
lation between import and export exchange rates by reporting the projection coef-
ficients of firm-level import-weighted exchange rates Δ  e f, t M on  destination- specific 
exchange rates Δ  e k, t across the quartiles of import-intensity distribution. We 
33 The import-weighted exchange rate Δ  e f, t M is a weighted average of bilateral exchange rates with weights equal 
to the import expenditure shares from outside the euro zone at the firm level.


























Import intensity bins, φ
f
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4
Figure 2. Marginal Cost Sensitivity to Exchange Rates
Notes: The figure plots the pass-through coefficients from regressions of the log change in our 
measure of the marginal cost of the firm Δ m c  f, t ∗ on both bilateral export exchange rates Δ  e k, t 
and firm-level import-weighted exchange rate Δ  e f, t M , by quartiles of the  φ f distribution (as in 
Figure 1). Additional information is reported in Table A1 in the online Appendix.
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find these projection coefficients to be stable at around 0.45, with no statistically 
detectable variation across bins of import intensity. Therefore, we find no system-
atic  relationship between import intensity and the extent to which firms align their 
import sources and export destinations to hedge their exchange rate risks (i.e., real 
hedging).
We next show the importance of this positive correlation between import and 
export exchange rates for exchange rate pass-through into export prices. Intuitively, 
we would expect the effects of import intensity to be stronger when inputs are 
imported from the same country to which the firm sells its products. To capture this 
idea systematically, we split all source-destination pairs of countries into a high and 
a low correlation bin  depending on whether the correlation between (the annual 
log changes in) the two respective exchange rates is above or below 0.7. For each 
firm destination we create two measures of import intensity,  φ f, k High and  φ f, k Low , from 
high- and low-correlation source countries respectively.34 The average correlation 
between exchange rates in the two bins is 0.92 and 0.25 respectively, and according 
to the theory (see equation (16)) this difference should directly translate into the dif-
ferential effect of the two import intensities on the exchange rate pass-through of the 
firm. This is exactly what we find in column 1 of Table 7, which estimates the aug-
mented specification (21) splitting the firm import intensity into the two  components 
just introduced. The estimated coefficients on the high- and  low-correlation import 
intensity interactions are 0.86 and 0.38 respectively.
We further show that the effect of import intensity on export price pass-through 
is stronger when the pass-through into imported input prices is higher. We con-
struct the different import intensity measures by splitting all non-euro import source 
countries in our sample into three groups: high pass-through, low pass-through, and 
other. The group of other countries contains source countries for which there are 
either insufficient observations or not enough variation in the exchange rate to esti-
mate import price pass-through accurately. The remaining countries are assigned 
to the high bin  if pass-through exceeds 0.5, and the results are robust to alterna-
tive choices of this cutoff. With this procedure we have 19 countries in the high 
pass-through bin with average pass-through into Belgian import prices of 63 per-
cent and accounting for 38 percent of Belgian firm imports. The low pass-through 
bin contains 32 countries with average pass-through of 25 percent and accounting 
for 42 percent of Belgian firm imports. The list of countries, their pass-through and 
import shares are reported in Table A3 in the online Appendix. We use the three 
 corresponding import  intensity variables to estimate an augmented specification 
(21) in column 2 of Table 7. As predicted by the theory, we find a higher coefficient, 
34 Note that our overall measure of import intensity equals  φ f ≡  φ f, k High +  φ f, k Low for all destinations k served by 
firm f. Table A2 in the online Appendix reports information on the pairs of high- and low-correlation countries. 
Our results are robust to alternative correlation thresholds, however raising it too high (e.g., setting it at 1, which 
amounts to placing in the high bin only the imports from the destination country itself in most cases), leaves the 
high-correlation bin too thin for reliable statistical inference, while reducing it below 0.7 does not allow us to dis-
criminate effectively between very high correlation countries (near pegs) and average correlation countries given 
the substantial noise associated with the correlation measures. With the threshold of 0.7, the set of high-correlation 
source countries accounts for 22 percent of total imports.
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equal to 0.76, for import intensity from high-pass-through countries, while the coef-
ficient for the low-pass-through imports is 0.35 and insignificant.35
In column 3 of Table 7, instead of splitting the import intensity from outside the 
euro area ( φ f ), we additionally control for the import intensity from within the euro 
area (denoted with  φ f Euro ). As expected, we find that import intensity from within the 
euro area has no effect on pass-through, since the prices of these imports, just like 
those of the Belgium inputs, are insensitive to the euro exchange rate. This regres-
sion can be viewed as a placebo test confirming that our import intensity measure  φ f 
indeed picks up the marginal cost sensitivity to exchange rates rather than proxying 
for other dimensions of heterogeneity across firms related to import intensity. The 
35 While the share of high-correlation imports is stable at around 22 percent across firms with different import 
intensity, the share of high-pass-through imports increases from 34 to 44 percent across import intensity quartiles, 











Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ  e k, t 0.053* 0.058* 0.044 0.044(0.031) (0.031) (0.040) (0.040)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f — — 0.481*** —(0.110)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f, k High 0.864*** 0.778*** — 0.472*** (0.277) (0.242) (0.154)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f, k Low 0.376*** 0.341 — 0.505** (0.131) (0.241) (0.210)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f Other — 0.027 — —(0.316)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f Euro — — 0.060 0.057(0.126) (0.126)
Δ  e k, t ·  S f, s, k, t 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.282*** 0.282*** (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064)
FE:  δ  s, k +  δ  t Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 93,395 93,395 93,395 93,395
 R 2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Notes: Results from the augmented specification
  Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ =  [ α +  β  High  φ f, k  High +  β  Low  φ f, k Low +  β  Other  φ f, k Other + γ S f, s, k, t ] Δ  e k, t + ⋯ +  ϵ f, i, k, t .
Column 1: splits imports into high and low correlation bins for each firm-destination depending 
on whether the correlation (based on annual log changes) between import and export exchange 
rate is above 0.7; decomposition of import intensity:  φ f ≡  φ f, k High +  φ f, k Low for every destination k. 
Column 2: splits imports by pass-through into import prices into three bins: high (above 0.5), 
low (below 0.5), and other (imprecisely estimated), as explained in the text  ( φ f ≡  φ f High +  φ f Low +  φ f Other ) . Column 3: does not split imports from outside the euro area ( φ f ), but instead 
additionally includes import intensity from within the euro area ( φ f Euro ). Column 4: splits 
 non-euro imports into imports from high-income OECD and low-income non-OECD coun-
tries ( φ f ≡  φ f High +  φ f Low ), also controlling for non-euro imports ( φ f Euro ). All regressions addi-
tionally control for the levels of all interaction terms and include country-destination and time 
fixed effects. Other details as in Table 5.
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results in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 7 provide direct evidence of the theoretical 
mechanisms linking import intensity and exchange rate pass-through.
Lastly, we ask whether there may be additional forces correlated with the firm’s 
import intensity that could potentially confound its relationship with the exchange 
rate pass-through. A noticeable difference across firms is in their share of imports 
that comes from non-OECD countries, which tends to be substantially higher for 
the high-import-intensive firms. The import share from non-OECD countries in total 
non-euro imports increases monotonically from 25 to 45 percent across the quartiles 
of import intensity.36 Column 4 of Table 7 explores the effects of this  heterogeneity 
by splitting the overall measure of the firm’s import intensity  φ f into the import 
intensities from the high-income OECD and low-income non-OECD countries, both 
outside the euro area. Surprisingly, we find no difference in the effects of import 
intensity from OECD and non-OECD countries, with both coefficients estimated to 
be around 0.5. As expected, OECD countries tend to have higher pass-through into 
import prices of Belgian firms: 44 percent on average versus 15 percent on aver-
age from non-OECD countries, though there is significant variation within these 
groups as reflected in Table  A3 in the online Appendix. However, the effects of 
these import pass-through differences are counterbalanced by the correlation pat-
tern between import and export exchange rates. Indeed, almost all source countries 
in the high- correlation pairs with destination countries are non-OECD, which is 
to a large extent driven by the full or partial exchange rate pegs adopted by many 
non-OECD countries. Overall, we find that the composition of imports from OECD 
versus non-OECD countries has no detectable effect on the export pass-through of 
Belgian firms.37
To summarize, the data strongly support the specific mechanisms identified by the 
theory, and we find no evidence that our import intensity measure proxies for other 
mechanisms or variables that may affect pass-through.
E. Robustness
In this section, we consider three sets of robustness tests: including additional 
controls, considering alternative definitions of import intensity, and using alternative 
samples in terms of included destinations, firms, and products. We conclude the sec-
tion by a discussion of the possible selection and measurement issues.
Additional Controls.—In Table  8, we check whether our results are robust to 
adding in alternative proxies for markup and marginal cost variability such as firm 
36 Both patterns are consistent with the presence of a fixed cost of importing which increases with the geographic 
and economic distance to the source country, making it worthwhile only for the largest importers to source inputs 
from the distant countries.
37 The other two possibilities we explored were whether pass-through into import prices of Belgian firms varies 
by the type of the product imported (manufactured or not) and/or by the type (size) of the importing firm. Although 
the share of manufactured products in imports decreases from 95 to 86 percent across the quartiles of import inten-
sity, we find no systematic difference in pass-through for manufacturing and nonmanufacturing imports, once we 
control for the source country of imports. Similarly, controlling for the source country, we find no systematic differ-
ence in import pass-through between small and large firms. Section IIIE presents further robustness tests controlling 
for the size of the firm and types of imported inputs.
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employment size and measured TFP.38 The results reported in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 8 show that the coefficients on the main variables of interest are hardly affected 
by the inclusion of these additional interaction terms. Controlling for employment 
and TFP interactions reduces slightly the estimated coefficients on import intensity 
and market share interactions, but they remain large and strongly statistically sig-
nificant. The coefficients on employment and TFP interactions are also positive and 
significant,  indicating that other factors outside our model also influence exchange 
rate pass-through. Column 3 of Table 8 augments the specification in column 2 
by controlling for the local component of the marginal cost—proxied by the log 
changes in the measure of the firm-level wage rate and the firm TFP—to isolate the 
effect of import intensity through the foreign-sourced component of the marginal 
cost of the firm. These additional controls have essentially no effect on the estimated 
coefficients.
Alternative Definitions of Import Intensity.—To ensure that the results are not 
sensitive to our definition of  φ f , we experimented extensively with alternative defini-
tions. We report these robustness checks in Table A4 in the online Appendix, where 
we estimate our main empirical specification using different definitions of import 
intensity. First, in column 1, we verify that our results are unchanged when as in 
specification (21) we use lagged time-varying  φ f, t−1 and  S f, s, k, t−1 , as suggested by 
38 In theories where productivity is the only source of heterogeneity, market share, employment, and productiv-
ity itself are all perfectly correlated. However, when there is more than one source of heterogeneity, these variables 
are correlated positively but imperfectly (as we document in Table 4), which allows us to jointly include these 
variables in one specification. Our empirical results are consistent with Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012), which 
focus on firm productivity as a measure of markup variability—we also find that more productive firms have lower 
 pass-through, but we split this effect into the markup and marginal cost channels by controlling separately for mar-
ket share and import intensity.
Table 8—Robustness with Additional Controls
Dependent variable: Δ  p f, i, k, t ∗ (1) (2) (3)
Δ  e k, t ·  φ f 0.413*** 0.433*** 0.418*** (0.106) (0.109) (0.119)
Δ  e k, t ·  S f, s, k, t 0.219*** 0.249*** 0.245*** (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
Δ  e k, t · log  L f, t 0.044*** (0.012)
Δ  e k, t · log TF P f, t 0.070*** 0.080*** (0.023) (0.024)
Δ log  W f, t ∗ 0.004* (0.002)
Δ log TF P f, t 0.035*** (0.007)
FE:  δ  s, k +  δ  t Yes Yes Yes
Observations 92,576 92,106 87,608
 R 2 0.058 0.058 0.061
Notes: The same specification as in column 6 of Table 5, augmented with additional controls. 
L f, t is firm employment,  W f, t 
 ∗ is firm average wage rate, and  TFP f, t is the estimate of firm total 
factor productivity.
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Proposition 4, instead of  φ f and  S f, s, k, t  respectively. Remarkably, the estimated coef-
ficients are virtually the same as in Table 5.
Next, in column 2 of Table A4 we include only manufacturing products in the 
construction of the import intensity variable. In columns 3 and 4, we respectively 
restrict the definition of imports to exclude consumer goods and capital goods. In 
the subsequent columns, we use IO tables to identify a firm’s intermediate inputs. In 
column 5, we include only imports identified as intermediate inputs in the IO tables 
for all of the firm’s exports, and in column 6 we only include IO inputs for a firm’s 
IO major exports. Finally, in column 7, we exclude any import at the CN- 8-digit 
industrial code if the firm simultaneously exports in this category. In all cases, the 
results are essentially unchanged, except that in the last case the coefficient on the 
import intensity substantially increases, but it should be noted that the average 
import intensities here are much lower as we drop a large share of imports from the 
import intensity calculation.
Alternative Samples.—We further check the robustness of our results within alter-
native subsamples of the dataset, both in the coverage of export destinations and in 
the types of products and firms. Table A5 in the online Appendix reports the results 
in eight alternative subsamples. By and large, it reveals the same qualitative and 
quantitative patterns we find in our benchmark sample.
Columns 1–3 of Table A5 report the results for three alternative sets of export des-
tinations—all non-euro countries, non-euro OECD countries excluding the United 
States, and the United States only. It is noteworthy that for the US subsample we 
estimate both a lower baseline pass-through (for firms with zero import intensity 
and market share) and a stronger effect of import intensity on pass-through, than 
for other countries.39 Our analysis in Section IIID suggests that the larger effect of 
import intensity on pass-through into export prices to the United States is at least 
in part due to the stronger correlation between the euro-dollar exchange rate and a 
typical Belgian firm’s import-weighted exchange rate (see Table A2).
The remaining columns  in Table  A5 consider different sets of products and 
firms. So far, all of the specifications have been restricted to the subsample of only 
 manufacturing firms because our  φ f measure is likely to be a better proxy of import 
intensity in manufacturing than for wholesalers, who may purchase final goods 
within Belgium to export them or alternatively import final goods for distribution 
within Belgium. In column  4, which adds in all wholesale firms to our baseline 
sample, we see that although the import intensity and market share interactions are 
still positive and significant, their magnitudes and t-stats are smaller. The wholesal-
ers represent around 40 percent of the combined sample. Next, in column 5, we drop 
all intra-firm transactions from our baseline sample (around 15 percent of observa-
tions), and this has little effect on the estimated coefficients.40
39 Specifically, small nonimporting firms exporting to the US market pass-through on average only 82 percent 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate changes, while the firms with high import-intensity and high market share (at the 
 ninety-fifth percentile) pass-through only 33 percent. This low pass-through is consistent with previous work using 
US data.
40 Using data from the Belgium National Bank, we classify intra-firm trade as any export transaction from a 
Belgium firm to country k in which there is either inward or outward foreign direct investment to or from that country.
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Finally, our sample has included only the firm’s major export products, based on its 
largest IO code, in order to address the issue of multiproduct firms. In  columns 6–8, 
we show that the results are not sensitive to this choice of “main products.” In col-
umn 6, we include all of the firm’s manufacturing exports rather than restricting it 
only to IO major products. In column 7, we adopt an alternative way to identify a 
firm’s major products, using the HS 4-digit category, which is much more disag-
gregated than the IO categories. And in column 8, we only include a firm if its HS 
4-digit major category accounts for at least 50 percent of its total exports. In all three 
cases, we find the magnitudes on the import intensity and market share interactions 
are very close to our main specification.
Sticky Prices and Currency Choice.—We now briefly comment on the interpreta-
tion of our results in an environment with sticky prices, where exporters choose to 
fix their prices temporarily either in local or in producer currency. Since we can-
not condition our empirical analysis on a price change or split the sample by cur-
rency of pricing, our results confound together the change in the desired markup 
with the mechanical changes in markup induced by the exchange rate movements 
when prices are sticky in a given currency.41 Therefore, one should keep in mind 
that our results suggest that import intensity and market share contribute either to 
flexible-price pass-through incompleteness or to the probability of local currency 
pricing, which in turn leads to low pass-through before prices adjust. In reality, both 
these forces are likely to contribute to incomplete pass-through in our data, however 
such a decomposition is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, Gopinath, 
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) show that the sticky price determinants of incomplete 
pass-through are largely shaped by the same underlying primitives as the flexible 
price determinants, and they reinforce each other in the cross section of firms (as we 
explain in footnote 9).
Measurement and Selection.—We conclude the empirical section with a brief dis-
cussion of measurement error and selection bias. One concern is that some firms, 
particularly small ones, may import their intermediate inputs through other Belgian 
firms (e.g., specialized importers), which we cannot observe in our data, and hence 
cannot adjust accordingly our measure of import intensity. Note, however, that this 
would work against our findings since some of the fundamentally import-intensive 
firms would be wrongly classified into low import-intensity. This measurement error 
should cause an upward bias in the estimate of our baseline pass-through (coeffi-
cient α in (21)) and a downward bias in our estimate of the import-intensity effect 
on pass-through (coefficient β ), which we find to be large nonetheless. Similarly, 
we expect the measurement error in import intensity for multiproduct firms to work 
against our findings. The measurement error for the market share variable is likely 
to have classical properties, and hence we expect to have a downward bias in the 
estimates of coefficient γ as well.
41 Our data do not allow us to do a decomposition into these two sources, as we explain in footnote 21, but one 
can make such an inference by taking a stand on a particular calibrated structural model of incomplete pass-through 
with sticky prices.
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Further, in the online Appendix we provide a formal theoretical argument that 
sample selection is also likely to lead to an upward bias in the estimates of α and a 
downward bias in the estimates of β and γ, as well as provide corroborating empiri-
cal evidence. Intuitively, the firms that drop out from the sample in response to an 
exchange rate appreciation (Δ  e k, t < 0) are more likely to be the ones simultane-
ously hit by an adverse marginal cost shock (e.g., negative productivity shock), and 
hence would want to raise prices more than firms staying in the sample. Censoring 
of these firms from the sample leads to an upward bias in α. Since the probability of 
exit decreases with import intensity and market share (proxying for firm’s profitabil-
ity), we expect this upward bias to be less severe for firms with high import intensity 
and high market shares, in other words a more shallow relationship between these 
variables and pass-through. To summarize, this analysis suggests that both measure-
ment and selection issues are likely to lead us to estimate lower bounds on both β 
and γ, and hence our quantitative account of the variation in pass-through should be 
viewed as conservative.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that taking into account that the largest exporting firms are 
also the largest importers is key to understanding the low aggregate exchange rate pass-
through and the variation in pass-through across firms. We find that import intensity 
affects pass-through both directly, by inducing an offsetting change in the marginal 
cost when exchange rates change, and indirectly, through selection into importing of 
the largest exporters with the most variable markups. We use firms’ import intensi-
ties and export market shares as proxies for the marginal cost and markup channels, 
respectively, and show that variation in these variables across firms explains a substan-
tial range of variation in pass-through. A small firm using no imported intermediate 
inputs has a nearly complete pass-through, while a firm at the ninety-fifth percentile 
of both market share and import intensity distributions has a pass-through of just over 
50 percent. Around half of this incomplete pass-through is due to the marginal cost 
channel, as captured by our import intensity measure. Since import intensity is heav-
ily skewed toward the largest exporters, our findings help explain the observed low 
aggregate pass-through elasticities, which play a central role in the study of exchange 
rate disconnect. Finally, we show that the patterns we document emerge naturally in a 
theoretical framework, which combines  standard ingredients of oligopolistic competi-
tion and variable markups with endogenous selection into importing at the firm level.
Our findings suggest that the marginal cost channel contributes substantially—
reinforcing and amplifying the markup channel—to low aggregate pass-through and 
pass-through variation across firms. The decomposition of incomplete pass-through 
into its marginal cost and markup components has important implications for the 
analysis of the welfare consequences of exchange rate volatility (as emphasized by 
Burstein and Jaimovich 2012) and the desirability to fix exchange rates, for exam-
ple, by means of integration into a currency union. Furthermore, price sensitivity 
to exchange rates is central to the expenditure switching mechanism at the core 
of international adjustment and rebalancing. A complete analysis of these topics 
requires a general equilibrium framework disciplined by the type of evidence on 
the importance of marginal cost and markup channels that we provide in this paper.
1976 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW july 2014
Controlling for the marginal cost channel, our evidence still assigns an impor-
tant role for the markup channel of incomplete pass-through. In particular, we find 
that large high-market-share firms adjust their markups by more in response to cost 
shocks. This is consistent with a model in which larger firms also choose higher levels 
of markups, a pattern that can rationalize the evidence on misallocation of resources 
across firms, as, for example, documented in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). The markup 
interpretation of this evidence on misallocation differs from the  cost-side frictions 
interpretation conventional in the literature (an exception is Peters 2013). Our evi-
dence, therefore, is useful for calibration and quantitative assessment of the models 
of misallocation at the firm level.
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